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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 ____________________________ 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 This appeal arises out of a civil RICO action, 18 
U.S.C.A. § 1951 et. seq. (1984), brought by plaintiff, Jaguar 
Cars, Inc. ("Jaguar"), against Theodore Forhecz, Sr., and his 
sons Theodore Forhecz, Jr. and Mark Forhecz, alleging that they 
                     
*
.  Honorable Anita B. Brody, United States District Judge for 
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
  
had perpetrated a scheme to systematically submit fraudulent 
warranty claims to Jaguar through their jointly owned Jaguar 
dealership, Royal Oaks Motor Car Company, Inc. ("Royal Oaks") in 
violation of RICO sections 1962(c) and (d).  A jury awarded 
Jaguar damages of $1.1 million against Theodore Forhecz, Sr. 
("Theodore, Sr.") and $900,000 against Mark Forhecz ("Mark").1  
In its final judgment, the district court molded the verdict to 
reflect treble damages for the RICO violations, as required by 18 
U.S.C.A. § 1964(c) (1984). 
 Theodore, Sr. contends that the evidence was legally 
insufficient to find him liable of the RICO predicate acts of 
aiding and abetting mail fraud.  Additionally, Theodore, Sr. and 
Mark ("the defendants") contend that Jaguar's RICO claims were 
legally insufficient because Jaguar failed to establish 
sufficient distinctiveness between the defendant "persons," 
allegedly liable for the RICO violations, and the "enterprise" 
through which those persons acted.  This latter contention 
requires us to reconsider our interpretation of the civil RICO 
statute in light of evolving Supreme Court precedent.  More 
particularly, we are faced with the question whether this court's 
jurisprudence concerning the distinctiveness requirement of 18 
U.S.C.A. § 1962(c) (1988), see Glessner v. Kenny, 952 F.2d 702, 
710 (3d Cir. 1991), survived the Supreme Court's opinions in 
                     
1
.  Theodore Forhecz, Jr. was in charge of sales and reported to 
his brother Mark.  Theodore, Jr. was absolved of RICO violations 
by the district court and is not a party to this appeal. 
 
  
Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S.Ct. 1163 (1993) and National 
Organization for Women v. Scheidler, 114 S.Ct. 798 (1994).  
 Because we decide that this court's application of the 
distinctiveness requirement of § 1962(c) to corporate officers 
and directors does not survive Reves and Scheidler, and because 
we are, therefore, satisfied that corporate officers/employees, 
such as the defendants, may properly be held liable as persons 
managing the affairs of their corporation as an enterprise 
through a pattern of racketeering activity, we will affirm.  
   I.  FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 Theodore, Sr. was the 51% owner and president of the 
Royal Oaks dealership.  The remaining 49% of the dealership was 
owned by Mark and Theodore, Jr.  Mark was the general manager of 
Royal Oaks and ran the day-to-day operations of the dealership.  
In managing Royal Oaks, Mark reported to his father, who was the 
president and majority shareholder.  Theodore, Sr. was actively 
involved in the operation of the dealership, earning a salary of 
roughly one-half million dollars a year for his services.  
Theodore, Sr. spent between twenty-five and thirty hours a week 
at Royal Oaks and met with Mark on a daily basis to discuss the 
dealership's operations. 
 The trial record demonstrated that the Royal Oaks 
dealership, through the actions of its employees, perpetrated a 
widespread scheme from as early as 1987 through May 1991 to 
defraud Jaguar through the submission of thousands of fraudulent 
warranty claims.  Under this scheme, warranty claims were 
continuously submitted to Jaguar for the cost of labor and parts 
  
for alleged repairs that were either unnecessary, were never 
actually performed, or were performed on cars that were no longer 
under warranty.  The scheme included submitting fictitious time-
sheets, doctoring the warranty paperwork submitted to Jaguar, and 
altering new parts to make them look old and in need of 
replacement.  Additionally, an outside sublet paint-and-body 
shop, Kolorworks, and its owner, Linda Kucharski, assisted the 
defendants by helping them construct fraudulent warranty claims 
for Royal Oaks to submit to Jaguar.   
 In total, Royal Oaks defrauded Jaguar in an amount of 
between one and two million dollars,2 enabling Royal Oaks to 
generate hundreds of thousands of dollars of warranty income per 
month and to maintain extremely lucrative salaries for the 
defendants through periods of declining sales income even though 
its work bays were often empty and its technicians idle.  The 
                     
2
.  The one to two million dollar estimate comes from testimony 
that between 30% and 60% of the warranty repairs at the 
dealership were fraudulent, combined with evidence that during 
this period Jaguar paid a total of $3,487,080 to Royal Oaks for 
warranty claims.  We reject defendants' contention on appeal that 
this evidence was too uncertain and speculative to support the 
jury's verdict of $1.1 million against Theodore, Sr. and $900,000 
against Mark.  Jaguar's inability to give exact data on the fraud 
was due to the defendants' secretive scheme in which the 
paperwork for legitimate and fraudulent transactions was 
identical.  It is well settled that in such circumstances "the 
jury may make a just and reasonable estimate of the damage based 
on relevant data."  Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 
251, 264, 66 S.Ct. 574, 580 (1946); see also Danny Kresky 
Enterprises Corp. v. Magid, 716 F.2d 206, 213 (3d Cir. 1983) 
("[P]laintiffs must be free to select their own damage theories 
as long as they are supported by a reasonable foundation.").  
Given the evidence presented by Jaguar, we conclude that the jury 
had a reasonable foundation on which to base its verdict.   
 
  
evidence presented at trial demonstrated that actual work had 
declined to a point where there were few, if any, cars in the 
service department.   
 Correspondingly, in order to occupy their time, the 
dealership's ten service technicians regularly sat at their 
workbenches reading magazines, or congregated to pitch coins, 
play ping-pong, softball, or operate electronic cars.    
 In October 1990, Jaguar began to suspect fraud at Royal 
Oaks and, in an unprecedented move, sent a team of officials into 
the dealership for an entire week to watch every repair being 
made.  In order to avoid detection, the defendants placed a load 
of new cars in the service areas for mock repairs, so that the 
area looked full and technicians were kept busy while Jaguar's 
representatives were at the dealership.  Such actions along with 
other modifications and refinements to the fraudulent scheme 
allowed the fraud to continue until May of 1991.   
 After discovering the fraud and terminating the 
dealership in May of 1991, Jaguar brought suit in the District 
Court for the District of New Jersey alleging violations of RICO 
sections 1962(c) and (d).  Section 1962(d) prohibits conspiring 
to violate sub-section (c).  18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(d) (West Supp. 
1994).  Accordingly, the viability of Jaguar's section (d) claim 
depends on the legal sufficiency of its § 1962(c) claim. 
 As noted above, the jury awarded damages against 
Theodore, Sr. and Mark on Jaguar's RICO claims.  The district 
court upheld the jury's award in response to the defendants' 
post-trial motions for judgment as a matter of law under Fed R. 
  
Civ. Proc. 50(a) or for a new trial under Fed. R. Civ. Proc. 59.  
This appeal from the judgment and from the district court's order 
denying the defendants' post-trial motions followed. 
  II. 
 The defendants contend that Jaguar's RICO claims were 
legally insufficient in that Jaguar failed to allege a violation 
of § 1962(c) by "persons" operating or managing a distinct 
"enterprise."  Since this is a question of law, we exercise 
plenary review.  See Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 
1153, 1166 (3d Cir. 1993).  Section 1962(c) provides, in relevant 
part: 
 It shall be unlawful for any person employed 
by or associated with any enterprise engaged 
in, or the activities which affect, 
interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or 
participate, directly or indirectly, in the 
conduct of such enterprise's affairs through 
a pattern of racketeering activity. . . . 
 
18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c) (1984).    
 It is uncontested, on appeal, that Royal Oaks conducted 
"a pattern of racketeering activity" which affected interstate 
commerce.  Given that § 1962(c) requires conduct by a "person 
employed by or associated with any enterprise," the issue is 
whether Jaguar has alleged activity by both a person and an 
enterprise.  "Person" includes "any individual or entity capable 
of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property."  18 
U.S.C.A. § 1961(3) (1984).  "Enterprise" includes "any 
individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal 
  
entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact 
although not a legal entity."  18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(4) (1984).  
 A.    
 This court first addressed § 1962(c)'s requirement to 
plead persons distinct from an enterprise in Hirsch v. Enright 
Refining Co., 751 F.2d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1984).  In Enright, a 
jewelry manufacturer brought an action alleging fraudulent 
misrepresentation and a corresponding violation of § 1962(c) 
against a lone defendant -- a corporation engaged in metal 
refining.  In Enright we concluded that the defendant corporation 
could not be liable under § 1962(c) in that "the `person' subject 
to liability cannot be the same entity as the `enterprise.'"  Id. 
at 633.  Because the person charged with liability in Enright, 
the corporate defendant, was "the same entity as the entity 
fulfilling the enterprise requirement," we reversed the § 1962(c) 
RICO judgment in favor of the plaintiff.  Id. at 633.   
 In Enright we articulated two grounds in support of our 
holding.  The first was a literal reading of the statute: "the 
language contemplates that the `person' must be associated with a 
separate `enterprise' before there can be RICO liability on the 
part of the `person.'"  Id.  The second ground was a belief that 
Congress intended to limit RICO's application to preventing the 
infiltration of legitimate organizations by criminal and corrupt 
organizations: "[i]t is in keeping with that Congressional scheme 
to orient section 1962(c) toward punishing the infiltrating 
criminals rather than the legitimate corporation which might be 
  
an innocent victim of the racketeering activity in some 
circumstances."  Id.   
 In Sedima v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 105 S.Ct. 3275 
(1985), the Supreme Court foreclosed Enright's second rationale.   
 Instead of being used against mobsters and 
organized criminals, [RICO] has become a tool 
for everyday fraud cases brought against 
respected and legitimate enterprises.  Yet 
Congress wanted to reach both legitimate and 
illegitimate enterprises.  The former enjoy 
neither an inherent incapacity for criminal 
activity nor immunity from its consequences.   
The fact that [RICO] is used against 
respected businesses allegedly engaged in a 
pattern of specifically identified criminal 
conduct is hardly a sufficient reason for 
assuming that the provision is being 
misconstrued. . . . The fact that RICO has 
been applied in situations not expressly 
anticipated by Congress does not demonstrate 
ambiguity.  It demonstrates breadth.  It is 
true that private civil actions under the 
statute are being brought almost solely 
against such defendants, rather than against 
the archetypal, intimidating mobster.  Yet 
this defect -- if defect it is -- is inherent 
in the statute as written, and its correction 
must lie with Congress.   
 
Id. at 499, 105 S.Ct. at 3286 (citation, internal quotation marks 
and footnote omitted).  Thus, the Court's holding in Sedima 
undermined the second basis of the Enright holding. 
 This court, nonetheless, properly continued after 
Sedima to apply a distinctiveness requirement, since Enright's 
holding was also based on § 1962(c)'s textual directive to allege 
conduct by defendant "persons" operating an "enterprise."  Thus, 
Enright's basic holding that "the `person' subject to liability 
cannot be the same entity as the `enterprise,'" Enright, 751 F.2d 
  
at 633, plainly survived Sedima.  See Glessner, 952 F.2d at 710 
("The requirement of distinctiveness stems from the statute 
itself, and has been applied following Sedima.");  Brittingham v. 
Mobil Corp., 943 F.2d 297, 300 (3d Cir. 1991) ("[T]he plain 
language of the statute provides that the person must be 
`employed by or associated with' -- and therefore separate from -
- the enterprise . . . .");  Petro-Tech, Inc. v. Western Co., 824 
F.2d 1349, 1359 (3d Cir. 1987) ("We explained in Enright that 
§ 1962(c) was drafted in such a way that Congress must have 
intended the `person' and the `enterprise' to be distinct 
entities under that provision.").   
 This court's post-Sedima jurisprudence, however, could 
be described as following an oblique angle, which, with the 
benefit of hindsight, appears unfortunate.  In defining the scope 
of the distinctiveness requirement, our cases focused not on the 
statutory rationale, but on a re-incarnation of the defunct 
infiltrating racketeer rationale of Enright.  Since, under the 
infiltrating racketeer rationale, legitimate corporations were 
properly viewed as victims of the racketeering activity, we 
reasoned that defendant persons needed to be associated with 
another separate, illegitimate infiltrating enterprise.  In other 
words, we concluded that a successful § 1962(c) claim could not 
allege conduct on the part of corporate officers and directors 
acting through a legitimate corporate enterprise.  This 
limitation on actions under § 1962(c) was born of a pre-Sedima 
"infiltrating racketeer" reading of RICO's legislative history, 
which, as explained below, was clearly emasculated by the Supreme 
  
Court in Reves and Scheidler.  Clear resolution of the issues 
requires, however, that we briefly sketch our post-Sedima 
jurisprudence.3  
 This jurisprudence began to diverge in Petro-Tech, Inc. 
v. Western Co., 824 F.2d at 1359, where, relying on the 
infiltrating racketeer legislative history cited in Enright, we 
held that "§ 1962(c) was intended to govern only those instances 
in which an `innocent' or `passive' corporation is victimized by 
the RICO `persons,' and either drained of its own money or used 
as a passive tool to extract money from third parties."  After 
Petro-Tech, we continued to adhere to this limitation on 
§ 1962(c) claims.   
 In Glessner v. Kenny, 952 F.2d at 710-14, we considered 
whether "the individual defendants who were officers and 
employees of the corporation[] can be the `persons' who were 
conducting a pattern of racketeering through the corporation[] as 
an enterprise."  Id. at 713.  Glessner involved a suit by 
defrauded customers against the defendants, William Kenney, and 
the other officers of Meenan Oil Co. ("Meenan"), who allegedly 
acted through the corporation to fraudulently market and sell 
residential home heating systems.  Glessner upheld the district 
                     
3
.  Although Reves and Scheidler did not explicitly address 
§ 1962(c)'s distinctiveness requirement, we nevertheless 
conclude, see infra part D, that these cases by implication 
emasculated our distinctiveness jurisprudence.  Given this 
conclusion, we believe it is necessary to first discuss and 
interpret this court's relevant post-Sedima jurisprudence in 
order to effectively demonstrate how the analysis of Reves and 
Scheidler implicitly overruled this court's interpretation of 
§ 1962(c)'s distinctiveness requirement. 
  
court's dismissal of plaintiffs' § 1962(c) claim for failure to 
plead persons distinct from the corporate enterprise.  The 
Glessner panel acknowledged that in certain instances officers 
and employees could constitute persons conducting a pattern of 
racketeering activity through a corporate enterprise (though it 
did not expand upon this statement).  Glessner, 952 F.2d at 713.  
Nevertheless, the panel dismissed the action on the authority of 
the Petro-Tech limitation of § 1962(c) claims to "only those 
instances in which an `innocent' or `passive' corporation is 
victimized by the RICO `persons,' and either drained of its own 
money or used as a passive tool to extract money from third 
parties."  Glessner, 952 F.2d at 713.   
 In concluding that plaintiffs failed to overcome this 
limitation, the Glessner panel stated: 
 [T]he plaintiffs' injuries for which suit was 
brought arose out of their failure to obtain 
the safe, state-of-the-art [home heating] 
units for which they paid.  The individual 
defendants were alleged to have participated 
in the fraudulent advertising as agents of 
the corporation.  The RICO case statement 
alleges merely that "all of the defendants 
held positions as officers and principals of 
the corporate defendants, and received income 
as such.  All of the defendants derived 
income from each and every sale of the [home 
heating] products.  These sales were 
generated by defendants' multiple mail fraud 
violations which combined into a pattern of 
racketeering."  This activity is 
indistinguishable from that alleged as to the 
corporations and is a far cry from the use by 
individuals of an innocent passive 
corporation contemplated by Petro-Tech.  We 
conclude therefore that this is not the 
situation in which individual defendants, 
whether employees/officers or not, can be 
viewed as distinct from the corporations 
  
deemed the enterprise.  It follows that 
dismissal of the section 1962(c) claim was 
not erroneous.  
 
Id. at 713-14 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  
Thus, the Glessner panel, relying in turn on Petro-Tech's 
infiltrating racketeer limitation to § 1962(c) actions, dismissed 
the plaintiffs' claim that the defendant persons conducted the 
corporate enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. 
 B. 
 Under this court's interpretation of § 1962(c), as 
articulated in Glessner, Jaguar's RICO claims would fail unless 
Royal Oaks was either (1) the victim of the defendant's scheme, 
or (2) a passive tool through which the scheme was conducted.  
Pointing to the Glessner panel's acknowledgement that officers 
and employees of a corporate enterprise could in certain 
instances be properly viewed as distinct defendant "persons" 
under this test, Jaguar initially contends that this is such a 
case and, accordingly, is distinguishable from Glessner.  
 We begin by observing that it seems inconceivable that 
Royal Oaks could be viewed as the victim of the defendants' 
racketeering activity, since Jaguar alleges that Royal Oaks is 
the enterprise through which the defendants conducted their 
racketeering activity.  Rather, Jaguar contends that its claim is 
distinguishable from Glessner in that the defendants in this 
action can be viewed as persons using Royal Oaks as a passive 
tool to extract money from third parties.   
  
 In determining the scope of the "passive tool" 
limitation, we begin by recognizing that in Glessner, the court 
concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to allege that the 
defendant officers were using Meenan as a passive tool to extract 
money from third parties.  The Glessner panel reached this 
conclusion despite the fact that the plaintiffs had alleged that 
the defendants had operated the Meenan corporation so as to 
derive income from multiple mail fraud violations.  Bound by the 
strictures of Petro-Tech, the Glessner panel reasoned that the 
defendants' activities were "a far cry from the use by 
individuals of an innocent passive corporation contemplated by 
Petro-Tech."  Glessner, 952 F.2d at 714.  Given this conclusion, 
and recognizing that the activity contemplated by Petro-Tech was 
rooted in Enright's infiltrating racketeer approach, we conclude 
that this court's current interpretation of § 1962(c) improperly 
limits its application to those circumstances where infiltrating 
racketeers have successfully positioned themselves as employees 
and/or officers within an otherwise legitimate corporate 
enterprise. 
 Our interpretation of this court's "passive instrument" 
limitation is buttressed by the recognition that corporations are 
by definition passive instruments, since they are artificially 
created legal persons that can only act through their officers 
and employees.  Thus, a test that examines whether a corporation 
is "a passive tool to extract money from third parties" can be 
useful in determining whether officers and employees are 
  
sufficiently distinct from the corporation only if one adopts the 
infiltrating-racketeer rationale.  
 In sum, we find Jaguar's contention that this case, 
unlike Glessner, satisfies our case law's interpretation of 
§ 1962(c)'s distinctiveness requirement unpersuasive.  In this 
action, as in Glessner, the plaintiffs have alleged that the 
defendant "persons" operated, as officers and employees, a 
corporate "enterprise" through a pattern of racketeering 
activity.  Similarly, like Glessner, the defendants here are not 
distinct, infiltrating racketeers operating a legitimate 
corporate enterprise as an innocent passive tool; rather, they 
are officers and employees actively managing the affairs of an 
otherwise legitimate corporation through a pattern of 
racketeering activity.   
 C.  
 Even though we conclude that this case is 
indistinguishable from Glessner, we nevertheless hold that the 
defendants here are liable under § 1962(c) as persons managing 
the affairs of their corporation as an enterprise through a 
pattern of racketeering activity, since this court's application 
of the distinctiveness requirement to shield corporate officers 
and directors from § 1962(c) liability does not survive Reves, 
113 S.Ct. at 1163 and Scheidler, 114 S.Ct at 798.  
 In Reves, the Supreme Court was faced with the question 
whether § 1962(c) "persons" must participate in the "operation or 
management" of the "enterprise" in order to be subject to 
liability.  The case involved a § 1962(c) action against auditors 
  
working for what was then the accounting firm of Arthur Young, 
which was engaged in an audit of the Farmer's Cooperative of 
Arkansas and Oklahoma ("the Co-op").  Reves, 113 S.Ct. at 1167.  
In certifying the Co-op's annual financial statements on two 
separate occasions, the auditors knowingly failed to reflect a 
Co-op investment at fair market value.  Id. at 1167-68.  Such a 
valuation would have resulted in the financial statements 
properly reflecting the Co-op's insolvency.  Id. 
 Given this malfeasance, the Co-op's trustee in 
bankruptcy brought state and federal securities fraud claims 
along with a RICO claim under § 1962(c) on behalf of a certified 
class of noteholders.  Id.  The trustee alleged that the auditors 
were the "persons" who conducted or participated in a corporate 
"enterprise" (the Co-op) through a pattern of racketeering 
activity consisting of the Co-op's fraudulent sale of securities 
with the aid of knowingly false financial statements.  While the 
auditors were found liable to the noteholders for their 
securities fraud claims,4 the Court faced the question whether 
they were also liable under § 1962(c) (that is, whether the 
auditors were persons conducting or participating in the conduct 
of the Co-op's affairs, given that the Co-op was the alleged 
"enterprise" under § 1962(c)).  Id. at 1169.   
                     
4
.  The auditors federal security fraud liability had been upheld 
by a previous Supreme Court opinion, addressing the question of 
whether the Co-op's notes were securities within the meaning of 
§ 3(a)(10) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.  Reves v. 
Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 110 S.Ct. 945 (1990). 
  
 The Court held that liability under § 1962(c) is 
limited to those who "participate in the operation or management 
of the enterprise itself."  Id. at 1173.  Since the auditors were 
independent and did not operate or manage the Co-op, the Court 
ruled that they were not liable under § 1962(c).5  In so holding, 
the Court undermined the use of § 1962(c) to hold liable 
"`outsiders' who have no official position within the 
enterprise."  Id.  Reading RICO's legislative history, the Court 
stated that subsections (a) and (b) of § 1962 addressed 
Congressional concern with the infiltration of legitimate 
organization by racketeers, while in contrast "§ 1962(c) is 
limited to persons `employed by or associated with' an 
enterprise, suggesting a more limited reach than subsections (a) 
                     
5
.  Commentators have observed that the plaintiffs in Reves could 
possibly have satisfied the operation and management requirement 
of § 1962(c) had they alleged the existence of another 
enterprise. 
 
 In Reves the enterprise was the Co-op, but 
this is not the only possibility.  Section 
1962(4) defines enterprise as including any 
"legal entity" . . . and "any union or group 
of individuals associated in fact although 
not a legal entity." . . . Thus, RICO's 
enterprise requirement can be satisfied by "a 
group of individuals associated in fact" even 
though not a distinct "legal entity."  What 
if plaintiff in Reves had alleged that an 
association in fact consisting of Arthur 
Young, Jack White [the Co-op's General 
Manager], and the Co-op constituted the 
racketeering enterprise, and that Arthur 
Young directed the affairs of this 
"enterprise?" 
 
See Daniel B. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Civil Rico after Reves: An 
Economic Commentary, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 193-94 (footnote omitted). 
  
and (b)."  Id.  (emphasis added); see also id. ("Of course, 
`outsiders' may be liable under § 1962(c) if they are `associated 
with' an enterprise and participate in the conduct of its affairs 
-- that is participate in the operation or management of the 
enterprise itself."). 
 In the wake of Reves, the Supreme Court reiterated its 
interpretation of § 1962(c) in National Organization for Women v. 
Scheidler, 114 S.Ct. at 798, which concluded that an economic 
motive was not required for liability under § 1962(c).  In so 
holding, the Court stated:  "By contrast [with subsections (a) 
and (b)], the `enterprise' in subsection (c) connotes generally 
the vehicle through which the unlawful pattern of racketeering 
activity is committed, rather than the victim of that activity."  
Id. at 804.  In light of Reves and Scheidler, we must, as Jaguar 
has requested, re-evaluate the liability under § 1962(c) of 
officers and employees acting through a corporate enterprise.6   
                     
6
.  We recognize that in Gasoline Sales v. Aero Oil Co., 1994 
U.S. App. LEXIS 30399 (3d Cir. November 1, 1994), this court 
continued to apply Glessner's limitation on § 1962(c) actions 
against officers and directors acting through a corporate 
"enterprise."  In Gasoline Sales, plaintiffs alleged, in part, 
that Getty Petroleum Corp. ("Getty") and its wholly-owned 
subsidiaries engaged in a widespread fraudulent scheme to defraud 
retail gasoline stations.  One of the plaintiff's claims in 
Gasoline Sales was against Getty's corporate officers, alleging 
that they operated and managed Getty as an enterprise through a 
pattern of racketeering activity.  Relying on Glessner, the 
Gasoline Sales panel upheld the dismissal of this claim, 
  
 We have held that corporate employees who 
victimize their employer by draining it of 
its own money or using it as a passive tool 
to extract money from third parties are 
proper section 1962(c) defendants.  Glessner, 
952 F.2d at 713. Where the employees merely 
  
 
 D.  
 Our case law heretofore has focused on the degree of 
distinctiveness between the defendant persons and the enterprise.  
As we have stated, this court has held that in order for 
liability under § 1962(c) to attach, the corporate enterprise 
must be either (1) a victim, or (2) a passive tool used to 
extract money from third parties (as opposed to the enterprise 
through which the fraudulent scheme was perpetrated).   But 
the first of these two situations -- a corporate "enterprise" as 
victim of the racketeering activity of the defendant "persons" -- 
is in direct conflict with both Reves and Scheidler.   
 In these cases the Supreme Court held that the 
"enterprise" in subsection (c) is properly viewed as the "vehicle 
through which the unlawful pattern of racketeering activity is 
committed, rather than the victim of that activity."  Scheidler, 
114 S.Ct. at 804; Reves, 113 S.Ct. at 1171 ("Congress 
(..continued) 
participate in the corporation's own fraud by 
acting as corporate agents, however, the 
employees may not be sued under section 
1962(c).  Id. at 713-14.   
 
Id. at *7. 
 Notwithstanding this court's internal operating 
procedures, see Internal Operating Procedure 9.1 (binding 
subsequent panels by prior published panel decisions absent in 
banc consideration), we conclude that the Gasoline Sales panel's 
application of the Glessner limitation is also not conclusive 
here because the Supreme Court's opinions in Reves and Scheidler 
were not called to the panel's attention, and the opinion did not 
either explicitly or implicitly decide the impact of those cases 
on the issues raised in that appeal. 
  
consistently referred to subsection (c) as prohibiting the 
operation of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering 
activity and to subsections (a) and (b) as prohibiting the 
acquisition of an enterprise.").  Consequently, a victim 
corporation "drained of its own money" by pilfering officers and 
employees could not reasonably be viewed as the enterprise 
through which employee persons carried out their racketeering 
activity.  Rather, in such an instance, the proper enterprise 
would be the association of employees who are victimizing the 
corporation, while the victim corporation would not be the 
enterprise, but instead the § 1962(c) claimant.  
 The second of our case law's two situations -- the use 
of a corporate enterprise by infiltrating racketeers as a passive 
tool or instrument to extract money from third parties -- remains 
a proper, but very limited, application of § 1962(c) under Reves.  
See Fischel & Sykes, supra, at 191 ("Unless the outsid[er] . . . 
is responsible for or in control of management decision making, 
enabling it to `direct the enterprise's affairs,' there can be no 
RICO liability" (quoting Reves, 113 S.Ct. at 1170)).  
 In Reves, the Court acknowledged that in certain rare 
instances infiltrating "persons" distinct from the corporate 
enterprise could satisfy the "operation or management test," if 
they exerted sufficient control over the corporation's 
activities.  "`[O]utsiders' may be liable under § 1962(c) if they 
are `associated with' an enterprise and participate in the 
conduct of its affairs -- that is, participate in the operation 
or management of the enterprise itself."  Reves, 113 S.Ct. at 
  
1173 ("An enterprise also might be `operated' or `managed' by 
others [those not in upper management] `associated with' the 
enterprise who exert control over it as, for example, by 
bribery.").   
 While a § 1962(c) claim can exist against persons 
distinct from the corporate enterprise, so long as they exert 
sufficient control over the enterprise, the Court has made clear 
that the provision's reach is not limited to such rare instances.  
In Reves the Court examined, and decided, the question whether 
the defendant auditors "participated in the management of the Co-
op."  Reves, 113 S.Ct. at 1173.  While the majority in Reves 
found that the auditors had not acted in a management capacity in 
their preparation of the Co-ops's financial statements, the 
dissent argued that the auditors "crossed the line separating 
`outside' auditors from `inside' financial managers."7  Reves, 
113 S.Ct. at 1178 (Souter dissenting).  Implicit in the Court's 
analysis then, was the recognition that "inside" managers are the 
"persons" § 1962(c) was designed to reach.  Thus, Glessner's 
limitation to "outside" defendants, who either victimize the 
corporate enterprise or operate it as a passive tool, cannot 
survive the Court's holding in Reves that "inside" managers are 
properly liable under § 1962(c). 
                     
7
.  We note that this court applied Reves in a similar context in 
affirming the dismissal of a § 1962(c) RICO claim against 
independent auditors, but without needing to consider its 
implication on our distinctiveness requirement.  See University 
of Maryland v. Peat, Marwick, Main & Co., 996 F.2d 1534, 1538-39 
(3d Cir. 1993). 
  
 Finally, we note that, if we fail to overrule this 
court's interpretation of § 1962(c), its combination with Reves 
would hold liable only those persons who are sufficiently 
connected to an enterprise so as to operate or manage it while 
still remaining sufficiently distinct from the enterprise so as 
to victimize or passively control it.  Congress could not have 
intended such a razor thin zone of application.  See Sedima, 473 
U.S. at 497-98, 105 S.Ct. at 3285 ("RICO is to be read broadly.  
This is the lesson not only of Congress' self-consciously 
expansive language and overall approach but also of its express 
admonition that RICO is to `be liberally construed to effectuate 
its remedial purposes,' Pub. L. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 947." 
(citation omitted)).  As we have stated, our distinctiveness 
jurisprudence was born of the now defunct, pre-Sedima, 
infiltrating racketeer reading of RICO's legislative history, and 
is now even more clearly at odds with Supreme Court precedent as 
demonstrated by Reves and Scheidler.  This court's interpretation 
of § 1962(c)'s distinctiveness requirement must therefore be 
brought in line with binding Supreme Court precedent. 
 E. 
 We are thus left with the question: what remains of the 
statutorily-based distinctiveness requirement after Reves and 
Scheidler?  As we have stated, this requirement originates in the 
statute's textual directive that § 1962(c) liability requires 
conduct by defendant "persons" acting through an "enterprise."  
In this regard, we conclude that the essential holding of Enright 
remains undisturbed -- a claim simply against one corporation as 
  
both "person" and "enterprise" is not sufficient.  Instead, a 
viable § 1962(c) action requires a claim against defendant 
"persons" acting through a distinct "enterprise."  But, alleging 
conduct by officers or employees who operate or manage a 
corporate enterprise satisfies this requirement.  A corporation 
is an entity legally distinct from its officers or employees, 
which satisfies the "enterprise" definition of 18 U.S.C.A. 
§ 1961(4).  This section provides that "`enterprise' includes any 
individual, partnership, corporation, association or other legal 
entity."  18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(4) (emphasis added).  Accordingly, 
Jaguar has satisfied the distinctiveness requirement of 
§ 1962(c).  Jaguar has not brought a claim against Royal Oaks, 
but instead seeks recovery from the defendants, as persons 
operating and managing the Royal Oaks enterprise through a 
pattern of racketeering activity. 
 We recognize that this court has, at times, supported 
its infiltrating-racketeer reading of subsection (c) by resort to 
the notion that "[s]uch an interpretation avoids the absurd 
result that a corporation may always be pled to be the enterprise 
controlled by its employees or officers."  Glessner, 952 F.2d at 
713.  Informed by the teaching of Reves and Scheidler, however, 
we do not believe that allowing a § 1962(c) action against 
officers conducting a pattern of racketeering activity through a 
corporate enterprise yields an "absurd result."  In such an 
action, the plaintiff can only recover against the defendant 
officers and cannot recover against the corporation simply by 
pleading the officers as the persons controlling the corporate 
  
enterprise, since the corporate enterprise is not liable under 
§ 1962(c) in this context.  Instead, a corporation would be 
liable under § 1962(c), only if it engages in racketeering 
activity as a "person" in another distinct "enterprise," since 
only "persons" are liable for violating § 1962(c).  Petro-Tech, 
824 F.2d at 1358.   
 This interpretation of the distinctiveness requirement 
of § 1962(c), not only accords with binding Supreme Court 
precedent, as described above, but also is supported by the 
interpretation adopted by all other circuits that have addressed 
the question.  In United States v. Robinson, 8 F.3d 398 (7th Cir. 
1993), for example, the Seventh Circuit was faced with a set of 
circumstances similar to those in this case.  There, criminal 
RICO charges were brought under § 1962(c) against the officers 
and controlling shareholders of Renoja, a corporation that 
operated as a Wendy's franchise.  The defendants engaged in a 
fraudulent scheme to defraud their franchisor, Wendy's 
International ("Wendy's"), by misstating the amount of their 
gross sales in order to avoid paying Wendy's the required royalty 
percentage.  The court, focusing on whether the defendant persons 
and the corporation were distinct legal entities, rejected the 
defendants' claim that the government had failed to satisfy the 
distinctiveness requirement of § 1962(c):  
 Robinson was charged with improperly 
conducting Renoja's activities, not his own 
activities. Robinson's claim that he and 
Renoja are inseparable entities is meritless. 
. . . Renoja was an incorporated business 
that employed several hundred people and 
  
filed separate income tax returns. Robinson 
and Renoja were not the same entity.  
  
Robinson, 8 F.3d at 407.   
 In reaching its conclusion, the Robinson panel relied 
on an earlier opinion by then Judge Posner in McCullough v. 
Suter, 757 F.2d 142, 144 (7th Cir. 1985), which held that an 
unincorporated sole proprietorship was a distinct enterprise from 
its owner because it employed several individuals.  In 
McCullough, Judge Posner had recognized that, if the sole 
proprietor had incorporated his business, the corporation could 
then properly be treated as an "enterprise" under § 1962(c) even 
if it employed no one else.  Id. at 144 ("If [a] one-man band 
incorporates, it gets some legal protections from the corporate 
form, such as limited liability; and it is just this sort of 
legal shield for illegal activity that RICO tries to pierce.").  
This result followed from the conjunctive definition of 
"enterprise" which includes both "legal entit[ies] and any . . . 
group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal 
entity."  18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(4) (emphasis added).  Thus, Judge 
Posner concluded, "[t]he only important thing is that it [the 
enterprise] be either formally (as when there is incorporation) 
or practically (as when there are other people besides the 
proprietor working in the organization) separable from the 
individual."  
 In accord with Robinson is Sever v. Alaska Pulp Corp., 
978 F.2d 1529 (9th Cir. 1992), where the Ninth Circuit considered 
a § 1962(c) claim by a former timber company employee against the 
  
officers of his former incorporated employer.  The plaintiff 
there alleged that the officers, acting through a corporate 
enterprise, blacklisted him for giving unfavorable testimony to a 
Congressional Subcommittee.  The district court dismissed the 
action on the grounds that there was "no distinction between the 
officers, agents and employees who operate the corporation and 
the corporation itself."  Id. at 1534.  Addressing this argument, 
the Ninth Circuit held that a corporation was by legal definition 
an enterprise distinct from its officers or employees:  
 This decision makes it clear that the 
inability of a corporation to operate except 
through its officers is not an impediment to 
section 1962(c) suits.  That fact poses a 
problem only when the corporation is the 
named defendant - when it is both the 
"person" and the "enterprise." In this case, 
however, [plaintiff] named the several 
individual officers as defendants/persons, 
and [the corporation] as the enterprise. 
Therefore, he has satisfied this allegation 
requirement.  
 
Sever, 978 F.2d at 1534.  Also in accord are Davis v. Mutual Life 
Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 367, 377-78 (6th Cir 1993), and Bennett v. Berg, 
685 F.2d 1053, 1061 (8th Cir. 1982), aff'd en banc 710 F.2d 1361 
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).  
 In sum, we conclude that when officers and/or employees 
operate and manage a legitimate corporation, and use it to 
conduct, through interstate commerce, a pattern of racketeering 
activity, those defendant persons are properly liable under 
§ 1962(c).    
 
 III.   
  
 In addition to challenging the legal sufficiency of his 
RICO violation based on the distinctiveness requirement, 
Theodore, Sr. ("Theodore") contends that insufficient evidence 
was presented at trial to support the jury's finding that he was 
liable of the predicate acts of mail fraud.8  The district court 
considered this contention and concluded "that a reasonable jury 
could readily have found liability on the RICO . . .  claims," 
because "[t]here was sufficient circumstantial evidence to prove 
Theodore's knowing involvement in the fraudulent management of 
the Royal Oaks service Department."  Mem. Op. at 3-4.    
 In reviewing an order denying or granting a judgment as 
a matter of law, we exercise plenary review, applying the same 
standard as the district court.  Lightning Lube, 4 F.3d at 1166.  
That standard permits such a motion to be granted "only if, 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
movant and, giving it the advantage of every fair and reasonable 
inference, there is insufficient evidence from which a jury 
reasonably could find liability."  Id.  In making such a 
determination, "the court may not weigh the evidence, determine 
the credibility of witnesses, or substitute its version of the 
facts for the jury's version."  Id.  While a "scintilla of 
evidence is not enough to sustain a verdict of liability," the 
                     
8
.  Since Jaguar elected to recover against the defendants based 
on the RICO claims and because we conclude that Theodore was 
properly found liable for the RICO violations, we do not reach 
his contention that the jury's assessment of liability against 
him for negligently overseeing the dealership and for unjust 
enrichment was legally insufficient. 
  
question is "whether there is evidence upon which the jury could 
properly find a verdict for that party."  Id.  It is 
uncontroverted that Mark and other dealership employees committed 
numerous acts of mail fraud by systematically mailing false and 
fraudulent warranty claims to Jaguar.  At issue on appeal is 
whether the evidence presented to the jury supports the 
conclusion that Theodore aided and abetted these predicate acts.  
 We have held that a defendant may be liable under RICO 
if he aided or abetted the commission of at least two predicate 
acts of mail fraud.  See Banks v. Wolk, 918 F.2d 418, 421 (3d 
Cir. 1990); Petro-Tech, 824 F.2d at 1356.  Civil RICO liability 
for aiding and abetting advances RICO's goal of permitting 
recovery from anyone who has committed the predicate offenses, 
"regardless of how he committed them."  Petro-Tech, 824 F.2d at 
1357.  In order to find a defendant liable for aiding and 
abetting a predicate act under RICO, the plaintiff must prove (1) 
that the substantive act has been committed, and (2) that the 
defendant alleged to have aided and abetted the act knew of the 
commission of the act and acted with intent to facilitate it.  
Local 560, 780 F.2d at 284.  The first element has concededly 
been met in this case.  With regard to the second, a plaintiff 
need not offer direct evidence of intent.  Rather, the fact 
finder may infer a defendant's knowledge and intent from 
circumstantial evidence.  See Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 
937 F.2d 899 (3d Cir. 1991); United States v. Local 560, 780 F.2d 
267, 284 ("[I]t has long been settled that it is permissible to 
infer from circumstantial evidence the existence of intent."). 
  
 We must therefore consider whether, giving Jaguar the 
advantage of every fair and reasonable inference, there is 
sufficient evidence from which a jury reasonably could find that 
Theodore knew of the fraud and acted with the intent to 
facilitate it.  We recognize, as Jaguar concedes, that no single 
piece of evidence links Theodore directly to the fraud.  Rather, 
Jaguar contends that while Mark directed the fraudulent scheme, 
Theodore's experience and active participation in the Royal Oaks 
dealership, combined with the extent of the fraud, present a 
sufficient basis from which a reasonable jury could have 
concluded that he was aware of and facilitated the fraudulent 
scheme.  We agree.   
 Theodore was the 51% owner and active president of the 
Royal Oaks Jaguar dealership.  While Theodore had been a car 
dealer since 1956, his son Mark had relatively little experience 
in operating a dealership.  Theodore was actively involved in the 
operation of Royal Oaks.  He spent roughly twenty-five to thirty 
hours a week at the dealership and had ultimate supervisory 
responsibility for the dealership's operations.  Theodore was 
Mark's supervisor, and met with him daily to discuss the 
operation of the dealership, including its parts and service 
department.  In order to have exculpated Theodore, the jury would 
had to have believed that in those meetings they never discussed, 
in any depth, the operation of the service department and the 
source of that department's income; even though, during this 
period, the service department was accounting for between 
$200,000 and $400,000 of the dealership's monthly income, thereby 
  
allowing Theodore to maintain his annual salary of one-half 
million dollars. 
 In our view, the evidence supports the conclusion that 
Theodore was aware of and concerned about all of the operations 
of the dealership.  His salary was five times the amount of any 
other employee, including Mark.  Theodore acknowledged in his 
testimony that he reviewed the dealership's financial statements 
on a monthly basis and spent "a lot" of time "inspecting and 
looking around the building."   
 Royal Oaks generated hundreds of thousands of dollars a 
month in warranty claims, while actual work had declined to a 
point where there were few, if any cars in the service 
department.  The evidence presented at trial demonstrated that 
the dealership's ten service technicians, in order to occupy 
their time, regularly sat at their workbenches reading magazines, 
or congregated to pitch coins, play ping-pong, play softball, or 
operate electronic cars.  Similarly, some technicians themselves 
asked to be laid off because they didn't believe that there was 
enough work to keep them busy.  In a dealership which employed a 
total of roughly thirty-five people, a jury could reasonably have 
found it likely that Theodore was aware of a fraudulent scheme so 
pervasive that the evidence suggested it was the subject of 
innumerable jokes among Royal Oaks' employees.   
 The jury could also reasonably have concluded that an 
experienced dealer, such as Theodore, would have grown suspicious 
of the excessive amount of service income attributable to 
warranty work, when examining the dealership's financial 
  
statements.  Because of the pervasive warranty fraud, Royal Oaks 
had an unusually high percentage of service department income 
attributable to warranty work, as opposed to customer-paid 
repairs.  Given Theodore's monthly scrutiny of the dealership's 
financial statements, the jury could have concluded he was aware 
of and facilitated the source of this aberrant financial data. 
 In addition, Theodore was aware of Jaguar's 
unprecedented week long monitoring of Royal Oaks' service 
department, and in response called Jaguar regarding it.  The jury 
could reasonably have found it inconceivable that Theodore was 
not aware of and did not facilitate the rampant fraud which both 
preceded and followed Jaguar's investigation.   
 In sum, we conclude that the evidence of Theodore's 
control over the dealership (including his spending significant 
time there, reviewing the financial statements, and discussing 
the dealership's operations on a daily basis with his son, the 
architect of the fraudulent scheme), combined with evidence of 
the pervasive nature of the fraudulent scheme, allowed the jury 
to reasonably find Theodore liable of aiding and abetting the 
predicate acts of mail fraud.   
 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district 
court and its order denying the defendants' post-trial motions 
will be affirmed.9 
                     
9
.  We have considered and rejected, either on the merits or as 
not relevant, all the remaining arguments raised in the 
defendants' brief.  Specifically, we note our rejection of the 
defendants' contention that the district court abused its 
discretion by refusing to delay the trial in order to permit the 
testimony of an expert witness not listed in the pretrial order.  
  
(..continued) 
The witness was supposed to testify that Royal Oaks' customers 
were satisfied with the service provided by the dealership.  This 
testimony is irrelevant to the allegation that Royal Oaks 
submitted false warranty claims to Jaguar, and hence we agree 
with the district court's ruling.   
 
